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ARTICLES 
THE IMPLICIT "TAKINGS" JURISPRUDENCE 
OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 
DAVID FRISCH* 
The question is of forced exchanges, not of forced transfers, for a transfer is 
not an exchange; and a forced transfer without equivalent, even for the ben-
efit of the state, would be a mere injustice, an act of power devoid of that 
tenderness which the principle of utility ever demands.•• 
INTRODUCTION 
A RTICLE 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code1 is well-known for its labyrinth of priority rules. Those rules are intended to sharply 
define the extent to which the secured creditor's interest in specific 
property of its debtor is effective against competing claims to that 
property.2 Since the Code was first drafted, scholars have struggled to 
articulate a single unifying theory that explains all aspects of Article 9 
* VISiting Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of \Vtlliam 
& Mary; Professor of Law Widener University School of Law. J.D., University of 
Miami; LL.M, Yale Law School A.B.A. advisor to the U.C.C. Article 2 (Sales) Draft-
ing Committee of the National Conference on Uniform State Laws. The views ex-
pressed herein are my own. 
I acknowledge with thanks the summer research grant so generously provided by 
Widener University School of Law. For invaluable editorial assistance, I thank Bar-
bara S. Hundley, Class of 1995, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & 
Mary. 
** Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 90 (Richard Hildreth trans., Oce-
ana Publications, Inc., ed 1975) (1864). 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all references and citations to "the Code" or 
"U.C.C." in this Article are to the text and comments of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (1994). 
2. Section 9-201 provides in part: "Except as other.vise provided by this Act a 
security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against pur-
chasers of the collateral and against creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201. Thus, unless some 
exception exists, a secured creditor prevails against all other parties. Unfortunately 
for the secured creditor, the Code provides a host of exceptions scattered throughout 
Part 3 of Article 9. See, e.g., id. §§ 9-301 (giving certain persons priority over un-
perfected security interests), 9-307 (protecting buyers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness), 9-308 ·(protecting buyers of chattel paper or instruments), 9-309 (protecting 
holders in due course and bona fide purchasers), 9-310 (giving priority to statutory 
and common law liens), 9-312 (ordering priority among confilcting security interests 
in the same collateral), 9-313 (relating to priority of interests in fixtures), 9-314 (relat-
ing to accessions), 9-315 (determining priority when goods are commingled or 
processed). Moreover, "despite 9-201's bold assertion that only other provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code override it, obviously other statutory law (such as the 
Internal Revenue Code and the Bankruptcy Code) must be considered." Douglas G. 
Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Security Interests in Personal Property 367-68 (1984). 
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priorities. Their efforts, however, remain largely unsatisfactory.3 
Without exception, each effort inevitably falters because of the asym-
metry of the statutory language. The structural asymmetry of the stat-
ute, and the persistent failure of theorists to rationalize Article 9, 
strongly suggest that it cannot be done.4 In any event, it seems clear 
that commentators have done just about all that can be done from 
within the analytical models that have governed discourse to date. 
The model advanced here is not intended to discredit all other theo-
ries, nor does it explain all Article 9 priorities. Instead, the model 
presents a fresh perspective that may help to explain, at least in part, 
particular Article 9 rules, and to assist in the debate over what those 
rules ought to be. The model rests on the simple notion that a security 
interest is a protectable property interest.5 Shifting the inquiry to a 
property model does not entail a radical alteration in the explanation 
of priorities, but it does recast the conflicts in terms that clearly pres-
ent the true interests at stake. Certainly, anyone who believes in the 
institution of private property is likely to resist the idea that property 
rights can be involuntarily transferred without compensation. Yet, in 
the realm of Article 9, such a forced transfer of rights is currently 
3. See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the 
Transfer of Property, 13 J. Legal Stud. 299, 309 (1984) (stating that efficiency is the 
explanatory principle underlying Article 9 priorities); David M. Phillips, The Com-
mercial Culpability Scale, 92 Yale LJ. 228, 251-54 (1982) (contending that the relative 
culpability of the claimants is the explanatory principle underlying Article 9 priori-
ties). For an excellent critique of these explanations and the assertion that Article 9's 
priorities cannot be explained by a single pervasive principle, see David G. Carlson, 
Rationality, Accident, and Priority Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
71 Minn. L. Rev. 207 (1986). 
4. Indeed, contemporary commentators cannot even agree on the societal bene-
fits, if any, of secured credit. For a critical summary of the literature on this subject, 
see Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security 
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 Va. L. Rev. 2021 (1994). Even a cas-
ual follower of the secured transactions policy debates can see that the amount of 
published literature is voluminous; however, there are few, if any, empirical studies. 
Absent a comprehensive, fact-based perspective on why we are where we are, it is 
impossible to establish the broad framework of consensus on the need for the availa-
bility of secured credit. See id. at 2036 ("Whether the benefits of secured credit out-
weigh its costs in a few, many, or most of the circumstances in which security interests 
are granted is an empirical question that cannot be answered with any certainty using 
existing information."). 
5. It may be important to note there is some disagreement on this point. Com-
pare id. at 2051 ("It seems clear enough that security interests, under Article 9 and 
real estate law alike, are interests in property.") with id. at 2051 n.82 (acknowledging 
that certain scholars reject the notion that security interests are property interests). 
One purpose of this Article is to explicate, with some degree of detail, the proposition 
that security interests are property and the implications of that proposition. 
6. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 4 ("[N]or shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation."). The "just compensation" clause is appli-
cable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
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possible.7 If the contingent nature of security interests is at odds with 
the traditional conception of noncontingent property interests, it is 
reasonable to ask whether the difference can be convincingly 
explained.8 
In this Article the proposed model is applied to those situations in 
which a perfected security interest lapses because of the secured 
party's failure to take some action prescribed by the Code.9 Although 
the doctrine of lapsed perfection is only a small part of the complex 
body of Article 9 rules, it is an important part, both practically and 
conceptually. Practically, this doctrine is important because once a 
security interest becomes unperfected, it generally will no longer have 
priority over the claims of purchasers and lien creditors, 10 including 
the trustee in bankruptcy.11 Conceptually, the doctrine invites us to 
examine whether security interests are sufficiently distinct from other 
forms of property to justify an exception to the basic idea that prop-
erty rights are sufficiently durable so as to \vithstand a change in the 
conditions that existed when the rights were first acquired. 
Part I of this Article begins by reasserting that central to the idea of 
property rights is the legal entitlement to remedies that permits a per-
son to exercise dominion over the specific asset or to exclude the exer-
cise of dominion by others.12 Next, part I examines the essence of a 
security interest and demonstrates that it is a protected property inter-
est. Part II sets forth a model of priorities that suggests that although 
property interests should ordinarily be protected by a property rule, 
there is something special about a security interest, implying the need 
for greater contingency and justifying a liability rule for their protec-
tion.13 Although security interests may be contingent, they should 
7. A transfer of rights, in this context, includes both the tennination and the sub-
ordination of a security interest See infra notes 68-83 and accompanying text. 
8. If it cannot, this of course does not necessarily suggest that security interests 
should be made less contingent It is quite conceivable that the more appropriate 
response is to make all property interests more contingent 
9. For an exhaustive analysis of the doctrine of lapse, see Michael P. Pearson, 
Absolute Versus Conditional Protection for Secured Parties: Problems of Lapsed 
Perfection Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 Hous. L Rev. 1 
(1979). 
10. See U.C.C. § 9-301. 
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1994). 
12. Portions of this part are adapted with some substantive revisions, from the 
relevant parts of David Frisch, Remedies as Property: A Different Perspective on Spe-
cific Performance Clauses, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1691 (1994). 
13. A legal entitlement is protected by a property rule when it cannot be trans-
ferred without the owner's consent Consequently, anyone who wishes to acquire it is 
compelled to purchase it at a price acceptable to the owner. With a liability rule the 
transfer of an entitlement may be compelled without the current owner's consent, 
provided the owner is compensated, ex post, for its loss. See generally Guido Calnbresi 
& A Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972) (discussing the circumstances under 
which entitlements should be granted and protected by using a property, liability or 
inalienability rule). 
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rarely be subject to an uncompensated taking. Part III surveys the 
development and present status of the lapsed perfection doctrine 
under Article 9 and suggests an alternative formulation that is in-
tended to reflect the valid insights of the model. This part concludes 
that principles of compensation provide an appropriate guide for de-
termining issues of priority. Finally, part IV briefly discusses other 
contexts in which application of the model might be helpful. This Ar-
ticle concludes that although subordination of secured claims against a 
variety of other claimants is inevitable, conflicts must always be re-
solved by a continual elaboration of the nature of the competing inter-
ests. The statutory taking of a security interest without compensation 
is permitted, but only when the benefits are extremely high relative to 
the loss of property that results. 
I. SECURITY INTERESTS As PROPERTY 
A central intellectual theme of the analysis of property rights in the 
twentieth century has been a shift in focus from physical things to 
legal relations.14 It is now widely accepted that society would be un-
manageable if Blackstone's conception of property as the "sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the exter-
nal things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe"15 were an accurate description of the actual 
world. 
First, Blackstone's conception conflicts with the present-day reality 
that property is always subject to limitations. For example, the law 
tells us that (1) owners cannot always do with their property as they 
14. See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 357, 361 
(1954) ("[E]ssentially this institution of private property that we are trying to identify 
in outline is not a collection of physical objects, but rather a set of relationships 
.... "). In the words of Stephen Munzer: 
The other way of understanding property is the sophisticated conception. 
One might almost call it the legal conception, for it is very common among 
lawyers. It understands property as relations. More precisely, property con-
sists in certain relations, usually legal relations, among persons or other enti-
ties with respect to things. A metaphorical way of stating the sophisticated 
conception is that property is a bundle of "sticks." 
Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Property 16 (1990); see also Morris S. Cohen, Prop-
erty and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8, 12 (1928) ("Whatever technical definition of 
property we may prefer, we must recognize that a property right is a relation not 
between an owner and a thing, but between the owner and other individuals in refer-
ence to things."); Eirek G. Furuboth & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Eco-
nomic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. Econ. Literature 1137, 1139 (1972) 
("[P]roperty rights do not refer to relations between men and things but rather, to the 
sanctioned behavioral relations among men that arise from the existence of things and 
pertain to their use."). 
15. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries On the Laws of England 2 (1992). This 
conception has two aspects or dimensions: property can exist only in tangible things 
and all property is absolute. Clearly, neither aspect is credible today. 
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please;16 (2) the right of owners to exclude others from their property 
is not unlimited;17 (3) the power that owners have to transfer their 
property is not without restriction;18 and (4) owners can, under certain 
circumstances, lose their property without their consent.19 
The second difficulty with this conception is that property may or 
may not involve tangible things. The idea that property is limited to a 
collection of physical objects lost whatever force it had when courts 
looked for ways to extend the protective umbrella of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect new forms of wealth. 
The best strategy the courts found was to designate the interest in-
volved as property.20 
The most influential manifestation of the modem conception of 
property is the Restatement of Property.21 The best insights into the 
thinking that underlies the Restatement come from the initial para-
graph of the Introductory Note: 
The word "property" is used sometimes to denote the thing with 
respect to which legal relations between persons exist and some-
times to denote the legal relations. The former of these two usages 
is illustrated in the expressions "the property abuts on the highway" 
and "the property was destroyed by fire." This usage does not oc-
cur in this Restatement. When it is desired to indicate the thing 
with regard to which legal relations exist, it will be referred to either 
specifically as "the land," "the automobile," "the share of stock," 
or, generically, as "the subject matter of property" or "the thing."22 
This is a profoundly enlightening passage, and it explains why the 
term "property" is nowhere defined in the Restatement-a position 
that seemed necessary, because the term is used in the Restatement to 
16. See Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stan. L Rev. 611, 
641-42 n.108 (1988) (stating that the limitations on use include "building codes, nui-
sance law, law of easements, covenants, servitudes, licenses, profits, defeasible fees, 
law of waste, water rights, zoning, environmental protection statutes"). 
17. Id. (stating that the limitations on the power to exclude include "public accom-
modation laws, antidiscrimination laws and fair housing statutes, common carrier ob-
ligations to the public, free speech access to shopping centers or universities under 
state constitutional law, public policy exception to trespass law, the incomplete de-
fense of necessity"). 
18. Id. (stating that the limitations on the power to transfer include "the rule 
against perpetuities, rule against restraints on alienation, rule against creation of new 
estates, procedures for drafting valid wills, statutory forced shares, the public trust 
doctrine"). 
19. Id. (noting that an involuntary taking of property can result from "recording 
statutes, title registration, adverse possession, prescriptive easements, implied ease-
ments, marital property statutes, constructive trusts, eminent domain law"). 
20. See Dean G. Acheson, Book Review, 33 Harv. L Rev. 329, 330 (1920) 
("Everything was thought of in terms of property-reputation, privacy, domestic rela-
tions, and as new interests called for protection their success depended upon their 
ability to take on the protective coloring of property." (footnote omitted)). 
21. Restatement of Property (1936). 
22. Id., Introductory Note, ch. l, at 3. 
16 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
"denote legal relations between persons with respect to a thing."23 
For the drafters of the Restatement, the term "property," standing 
alone, was viewed as a weak vehicle for adequately expressing the 
widely differing types of relations that were possible. By instead using 
the defined terms "right,"24 "privilege,"25 "power,"26 and "immu-
nity,"27 the drafters were better able to promote the "[c]larity of 
thought and exactness of expression"28 they sought. 
A conception of property that assumes a relational context does 
nothing in itself, however, to distinguish between property relations 
and other legal relations. This is a serious and difficult problem. If 
property is properly thought of as a collection of legal relations be-
tween persons, how do we distinguish between property relations and 
other legal relations? Indeed, because all legal relations can be de-
scribed in terms of "rights, privileges, powers, and immunities," it has 
been suggested that, under the Restatement, the right to kill in self-
defense could qualify as a property right.29 Thus, although the obser-
23. Id. 
24. Id. § 1 ("A right ... is a legally enforceable claim of one person against an-
other, that the other shall do a given act or shall not do a given act."). 
25. Id. § 2 ("A privilege ... is a legal freedom on the part of one person as against 
another to do a given act or a legal freedom not to do a given act."). 
26. Id. § 3 ("A power ... is an ability on the part of a person to produce a change 
in a given legal relation by doing or not doing a given act."). 
27. Id. § 4 ("An immunity ... is a freedom on the part of one person against 
having a given legal relation altered by a given act or omission to act on the part of 
another person."). 
28. Id. ch. 1, at 4. It should be noted that the language used and the conception of 
property embodied in the Restatement was not new. It grew out of the analytical 
jurisprudence of Wesley N. Hohfeld. In a well-known series of articles, Hohfeld set 
out the contours of what he described as the eight "lowest common denominators of 
the law." Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 58 (1913) [hereinafter Judicial Reasoning J]; Wes-
ley N. Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases, 27 Yale L.J. 66 (1917); 
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
26 Yale L.J. 710 (1917) [hereinafter Judicial Reasoning II]. These denominators 
consist of four primary entitlements (rights, privileges, powers, and immunities) and 
their opposites and correlatives (no-rights, duties, disabilities, and liabilities). It was 
Hohfeld's purpose to demonstrate that only by using these fundamental conceptions 
was it possible to "think straight" about everyday legal problems. See Judicial Reason-
ing I, supra, at 18. In this connection, he exposed abstract legal ideas like "title," "due 
process," "privity," and "ownership" as meaningless expressions and, hence, unsuita-
ble guides to the understanding and correct solutions of cases. 
29. See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 357, 365 
(1954). Cohen illustrates his point in the following exchange: 
C. .... Mr. Fielden, what do you think of the American Law Institute defi-
nition of property as including any "rights, privileges, powers and immuni-
ties?" Under that definition, would immunity from racial discrimination in 
the exercise of the franchise be a property right? 
F. Yes, under that definition I suppose it would. 
C. And would the right to kill in self-defense be a property right? 
F. Yes, I believe so. 
C. In fact, any legal relationship under the definition of the American Law 
Institute is property, is it not? 
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vation that property is a set of legal relations may prove highly useful, 
in a sense, we have taken only the first step. A relations-based theory 
cannot itself explain why certain kinds of relations are not and should 
not be considered property. As previously demonstrated,30 the "lib-
eral" concept of ownership can be used to explicate the standard inci-
dents of ownership and, in particular, to grasp which lesser incidents 
comprise more limited property rights. 
The argument proceeds first from the observation that the incidents 
of ownership that have value31 may be rendered meaningless, unless 
the owner is given the power to exclude third parties generally from 
exercising dominion over the thing.32 For example, one important in-
cident of ownership is the right to decide how the thing shall be used 
and by whom. This right would be seriously impaired, and possibly 
destroyed, unless some mechanism existed for securing the owner's 
possession. Legal remedies provide that mechanism. The conse-
quence of this view is that the relevant question here concerns the 
remedies that are available to the owner. 
When the existence of X's property interest in a thing is called into 
question, the courts have three altematives.33 They can (1) \vithhold 
all remedies, thus allowing third parties generally to deprive X of pos-
session and control; (2) require third parties generally to compensate 
X (pay damages) if they wish to deprive her of possession and control; 
Id. 
F. Yes, I think the definition is comprehensive enough to cover any legal 
relation. 
C. :Might such a definition of property be useful to the teachers of property 
law who agreed on this definition in case they want to stake out junsdic-
tional claims to cover any legal problem whatsoever in their property 
courses? 
F. Yes, I suppose it might have some utility in that direction. 
C. But this definition would not be useful to us in trying to determine 
whether property exists in a given [thing]? 
F. No. 
30. See Frisch, supra note 12, at 1706-10. The full or liberal concept o( ownership 
is explored in great detail by AM Honore. See AM Honore, Ownership, in Oxford 
Essays In Jurisprudence (First Series) 107 (A G. Guest ed., 1961). As Honore 
explains: 
Ownership comprises the right to possess, the right to use, the right to man-
age, the right to the income of the thing, the right to the capital. the right to 
security, the rights or incidents of transmissibility and absence o( term, the 
prohibition of harmful use, liability to execution, and the incident o( 
residuarity .... 
Id. at 113. He is careful to point out, however, that the presence o( all 11 incidents, 
while together sufficient to constitute ownership, may not be individually necessary. 
Id. at 112-13. 
31. All the incidents of ownership should not be seen as having positive value to 
the owner. For example, the prohibition of harmful use entails a disadvantage; the 
owner is under a duty not to use or manage the thing owned in ways that would be 
harmful to other members of the public. 
32. See Frisch, supra note 12, at 1710-16. 
33. Id. at 1716. 
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or (3) protect X's interest with a property rule, thus giving X the 
power to exclude third parties generally.34 Only the third option is 
consistent with the recognition of a property interest.35 Properly un-
derstood, a legal relation, defined as a right, privilege, power, or im-
munity, that a person has with regard to a thing is a property relation 
only if a possessory remedy is available for its protection. 
It is possible to understand the precise nature of a security interest 
by understanding that a property interest is predicated on the reme-
dial power to exclude.36 The Code defines a security interest as "an 
interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or 
performance of an obligation."37 Although this language is strongly 
suggestive of a property interest, it must be understood that defini-
tions do not create property interests. Whatever terminology is em-
ployed, the key point is that a true property interest cannot be defined 
independently of the remedies that are available to the secured party. 
A preliminary comment must be made before turning to a discus-
sion of remedies. This Article does not claim that the existence of a 
property interest depends upon the availability of remedies that can 
be used to exclude all persons from the property; rather, it argues that 
the interest holder must be entitled to exclude persons generally.38 
34. Id. 
35. If the interest can only be protected by a liability rule, the interest (whatever 
else it may be) is not a property interest. See Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethink-
ing the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 Yale L.J. 1335, 1338-39 (1986) ("It is surely odd to 
claim that an individual's right is protected when another individual is permitted to 
force a transfer at a price set by third parties. Isn't the very idea of a forced transfer 
contrary to the autonomy or liberty thought constitutive of rights?"). This view 
reveals that the conception of entitlements includes more than property interests. For 
example, where a sales tax must be paid to the state when an item is sold, the state has 
an entitlement; but, few would argue that it has a property interest in the items that 
are subject to the tax. 
36. Courts often assert that a security interest is a property interest. See, e.g., Lou-
isville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (finding that mortgages 
given to secure a loan were a property interest). There the Court stated: 
If the public interest requires, and permits, the taking of property of individ-
ual mortgagees in order to relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors, 
resort must be had to proceedings by eminent domain; so that, through taxa-
tion, the burden of the relief afforded in the public interest may be borne by 
the public. 
Id. at 602. Unfortunately, such assertions are not explained. 
37. U.C.C. § 1-201(37). "The term also includes any interest of a buyer of ac-
counts or chattel paper which is subject to Article 9." Id. For purposes of this Article, 
the term "security interest" is used to denote the more limited and traditional interest 
described in the text. 
38. In other words, what we are looking for is a right that is in rem, not necessarily 
one that is in personam. On this distinction, Hohfeld writes: 
A paucital right, or claim, (right in personam) is either a unique right resid-
ing in a person (or group of persons) and availing against a single person (or 
single group of persons); or else it is one of a few fundamentally similar, yet 
separate, rights availing respectively against a few definite persons. A mul-
tital right, or claim, (right in rem) is always one of a large class of fundamen-
tally similar yet separate rights, actual and potential, residing in a single 
1995] ARTICLE 9 19 
For example, suppose that X, the owner of a machine, leases the 
machine to Y. X would no longer have the power to wrest possession 
of the machine from Y; yet, no one would doubt that X continues to 
have a property interest in the machine. Moreover, X's property in-
terest does not preclude the possibility that Y may also have a prop-
erty interest in the machine.39 Whether Y has a security interest will 
depend on the extent to which she is empowered under the relevant 
law to exclude others. 
Therefore, before concluding that a security interest is a property 
interest, it is necessary to determine the character of the secured 
party's remedies. However, discussions about a secured party's reme-
dies are inevitably bound up with discussions about the particular se-
cured party's priority. For example, it is quite possible that a secured 
party with a subordinated interest may find that he is unable to gain 
possession of the collateral or control its disposition.40 In effect, ex-
amining the remedial consequences of an interest holder's priority il-
luminates the underlying political, social, and economic judgments 
about the rights at stake. Ultimately, for the thesis proposed here, it 
does not matter whether a security interest is a property interest in all 
cases. The normative question at issue is how the Code ought to re-
spond to security interests that are property interests.41 
person (or single group of persons) but availing respectively against persons 
constituting a very large and indefinite class of people. 
Judicial Reasoning II, supra note 28, at 718 (footnotes omitted). 
39. See International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U.S. 601 (1904). There, Jus-
tice Holmes explained: 
In the case at bar the United States is not the owner of the machines. it is 
true, but it is a lessee in possession, for a term which has not expired. It /zas a 
property, a right in rem, in the machines, which, though less extensive than 
absolute ownership, has the same incident of a right to use them while it 
lasts. 
Id. at 606 (emphasis added). 
40. See also infra notes 160-66 and accompanying te>.1. See generally J. Peter 
Byrne et al, Junior Creditors' Realization 011 Debtors' Equity Under U. C. C. Section 9-
311: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 77 Geo. LJ. 1905 (1989) (discussing the deficien-
cies of§ 9-311 in dealing with junior creditors' interests); Steve H. Nickles, Rights and 
Remedies Between U.C.C. Article 9 Secured Parties \Vitil Conflicting Security Interests 
in Goods, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 217, 230 (1983} (staling that when a subordinated interest 
does not satisfy a senior party's interest in a property the senior party may possess the 
collateral and control its disposition); Cynthia Starnes, U.C.C. Section 9-504 Sales by 
Junior Secured Parties: Is a Senior Entitled to Notice and Proceeds?, 52 U. Pitt. L 
Rev. 563 (1991) (discussing sales by junior secured parties under § 9-504); Steven 
Wechsler, Rights and Remedies of tlze Secured Party After an Urwutltori<,ed Transfer of 
Collateral· A Proposal for Balancing Competing Claims in Repossession, Resale, Pro-
ceeds, and Conversion Cases, 32 Buff. L. Rev. 373 (1983) (discussing the senior credi-
tor's rights as against junior creditors). 
41. Although the inlplications of a security interest's priority cannot be dismissed 
as beyond the scope of this Article, at this juncture assume a security interest with 
priority over all existing and potential third party claimants. 
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The Code specifically gives the secured party the right to take pos-
session of the collateral upon the debtor's default42 and either propose 
to keep it in satisfaction of the debt43 or resell it and apply the pro-
ceeds to the debt.44 Possession may be obtained "without judicial pro-
cess if this can be done without breach of the peace or [the secured 
party] may proceed by action."45 If a default does exist, the secured 
party's right to possession under section 9-503 will also be enforceable 
against a buyer or other transferee of the collateral.46 This means that 
the secured party can successfully replevy the collateral regardless of 
who the present possessor is. Moreover, if an unsecured creditor has 
levied on the collateral, the secured creditor may be able to vacate the 
levy and conduct the foreclosure.47 
If the collection of remedies available to the secured party after de-
fault establishes anything, it ought to be that it is a coherent basis for 
calling the interest a property interest.48 The question arises, how-
ever, as to whether there is any basis for finding the existence of a 
property interest prior to an event of default. That is, should an inter-
est be disqualified from being a property interest because the right to 
possession is contingent upon future events? The appropriate re-
sponse, in most cases, is that it should not. Understanding that the 
incidents of ownership may be spread in a variety of ways among two 
or more persons enables us to appreciate that a property interest may 
be present even though an immediate and unqualified right to posses-
sion is lacking.49 Moreover, in an appropriate case, the fact that there 
42. U.C.C. § 9-503 ("Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the 
right to take possession of the collateral."). For the present purpose, assume that the 
collateral is tangible and can be possessed. 
43. Id. § 9-505(2). 
44. Id. § 9-504. 
45. Id. § 9-503. See James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial 
Code 1206-07 (3d ed. 1988) ("A secured party, wishing to repossess by judicial action, 
has several means available. For instance, he can bring an action in replevin ( origi-
nally a common-law action, now largely codified). In other jurisdictions he can pro-
ceed under the statutory successor to replevin, an action of claim and delivery."). 
46. The source of the secured party's presumptive priority and better right to pos-
session is § 9-201. For the relevant text of this section, see supra note 2. For a more 
complete explanation of the secured party's rights following a transfer of the collat-
eral, see Steve H. Nickles, Enforcing Article 9 Security Interests Against Subordinate 
Buyers of Collateral, 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 511 (1982). 
47. Although § 9-311, providing that a debtor's rights may be voluntarily or invol-
untarily transferred, would seem to permit a levy and sale, many courts have held 
otherwise. Compare William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess & Leigh, Ltd., 276 N.Y.S.2d 659, 
663 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (permitting secured party to vacate the levy) and Brescher v. 
Associates Fm. Servs. Co., 460 So. 2d 464, 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (same) with 
First Nat'l Bank v. Sheriff of Milwaukee Co., 149 N.W.2d 548, 550-51 (Wis. 1967) 
(permitting lien creditor to sell the collateral). 
48. Although much more can be said about the secured party's remedies following 
a default, the purpose here is simply to facilitate a better understanding of why the 
security interest is indisputably a property interest. 
49. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. Nor should it matter that the 
contingency might never occur. For example, if we assume a lease with an option to 
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has been no default would not preclude a court from enjoining the 
debtor from disposing of the collateral or restraining third parties 
from interfering with the secured party's prospective right of 
possession. 50 
Given the remedies that enable the secured party to obtain posses-
sion of the collateral and to exclude others, there is strong reason to 
conclude that a security interest can qualify as a property interest re-
gardless of whether a default has occurred. The next logical step is to 
inquire whether there are reasons peculiar to security interests that 
would justify a departure from the more traditional model of noncon-
tingent property interests and the jurisprudence of takings. 
II. CONTINGENT INTERESTS AND THE "TAKINGS" JURISPRUDENCE 
OF ARTICLE 9 
As part I demonstrated, if the secured party can exercise its Article 
9 remedies free from the interference of others, a security interest can 
be considered a property interest Any concept of remedies, however, 
must assume a social context. To speak of the secured party's rights 
without considering where its interest stands in relation to others is 
illogical. Remedies should not be treated as an abstract concept, to be 
gauged without reference to other legal contingencies, such as the or-
der in which competing interests are ranked. Were remedies decided 
separately, outcomes would inevitably undermine the purposes of the 
statute or common law decision in which the priority rule is formu-
lated and expressed. This threat can be defused, however, once it is 
openly acknowledged that remedies are a particularly authoritative 
expression of a property claimant's relative priority. To understand 
and evaluate what all of this means for secured parties, attention must 
focus on Article 9. This part discusses the interests that are created 
after the security interest has attached. Specifically, this part assumes 
the ability of the subsequent claimant to take priority over the secured 
party. 
A. The Effect of Priority: Termination Versus Subordination 
Article 9 establishes two different methods for achieving a rela-
tional order of interests between the secured party and the later in 
time priority claimant: (1) termination of the security interest; (2) 
purchase, it is certainly possible that the lessor will never again be entitled to posses-
sion. Yet, no one would doubt in such a case that, prior to the time the lessee exer-
cises the option, the lessor continues to have a property interest in the subject matter 
of the lease. 
50. See, e.g., In re Haugabook Auto Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 954 
(MD. Ga.1971) (discussing remedies available to the holder of an unperfected secur-
ity interest in motor vehicles in a proceeding to restrain and enjoin the bankrupt from 
disposing of the collateral). 
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subordination of the security interest.s1 This section examines those 
aspects that bear on the "takings" question and the points made later 
in this part. The strategy here is to draw out the implicit conception of 
priority that animates each method, and to illuminate the ways in 
which this conception colors the chosen statutory language. Once this 
framework is in place, one can argue that the secured party's loss of 
priority will always diminish the value of its property and result in a 
taking. 
As for the first method, termination of the interest, in some situa-
tions the continued existence of the security interest would be incon-
sistent with the notion that the subsequent interest has priority. In 
such instances, the Code provides that the security interest is elimi-
nated altogether. For example, consider the language of section 9-
307(1 ): "A buyer in ordinary course of business ... takes free of a 
security interest created by his seller even though the security interest 
is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence."s2 Be-
cause the words "take free" were chosen to express the buyer's prior-
ity, the security interest will cease to exist once the sale has been 
completed. s3 
In this way, the drafters have guaranteed absolute protection to the 
buyer and all subsequent transferees.s4 Eliminating the security inter-
est, rather than subordinating it to the interest acquired by the ordi-
nary course buyer, appears to be a particular application of the black 
letter rule that a transferee of property ordinarily acquires whatever 
rights the transferor had.ss This rule in turn grew out of the notion 
51. Developing each of these methods in detail and identifying fully the policy 
judgments reflected in each is not a task to be undertaken here. See generally David 
G. Carlson, Death and Subordination Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code: Senior Buyers and Senior Lien Creditors, 5 Cardozo L. Rev. 547 {1984) (exam-
ining situations in which security interests should be subordinated to lien creditors 
and buyers and those in which the security interest should be eliminated). 
52. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (emphasis added). 
53. I have argued elsewhere that completion of the sale is not always a prerequi-
site for the buyer's protection. See David Frisch, Buyer Status Under the U.C.C.: A 
Suggested Temporal Definition, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 531, 570-71 {1987) (arguing that 
buyer status occurs at the moment the buyer obtains the remedial right to the goods 
vis-a-vis the seller). 
54. Because most ordinary course transfers are authorized (implicitly or explicitly) 
by the secured party, § 9-306(2) will also be terminal for the security interest. See § 9-
306(2) ("Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in 
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the dis-
position was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise 
.... "). 
55. The rule expressed in the text has two aspects. One is the "derivation" princi-
ple of nemo dat quad non habet (one cannot give what one does not have). Nemo dat 
dictates that the transferee takes its interest subject to all third party claims and in-
terests that were enforceable against the transferor. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-403(1) 
{describing the title acquired by a purchaser of goods), 3-305(a) (providing defenses 
to claims to enforce payment of an instrument), 3-306 (stating that a person without 
rights of a holder in due course takes an instrument subject to claims), 7-504(1) (pro-
1995] ARTICLE 9 23 
that the value of the priority interest should be unaffected by other 
competing interests.56 If the original security interest was permitted 
to linger, it would lead to the assumption that the interest could be 
reinvigorated if the goods were later transferred by the buyer. Given 
this assumption, the goods obviously would be worth considerably less 
to the buyer than comparable unencumbered goods. If not, there is 
no reason to permit the security interest to continue. In either event, 
this discussion of section 9-307(1) demonstrates the logic and signifi-
cance of choosing termination of the security interest as the method 
for protecting the buyer's priority. 
A quite different approach is taken in those sections that ex-press 
the idea of priority in terms of subordination.57 For example, section 
9-301(1)(b) provides: "[A]n unperfected security interest is 
subordinate to the rights of ... a person who becomes a lien creditor 
before the security interest is perfected."58 Putting aside the question 
of whether the security interest continues to have positive economic 
value, it is obvious that it continues to exist. Presumably, this viability 
is permitted because the interest of the senior lien is adequately safe-
guarded by the basic principle of lien foreclosure. As a general rule, a 
person who buys property at a foreclosure sale acquires the debtor's 
equity plus the equity created by the absence of the lien being fore-
closed and all subordinate liens and interests. 
Lien foreclosure inevitably preserves the value of the senior lien. If 
the secured party chooses to dispose of the collateral, she may do so 
viding that a transferee of a document acquires the title and rights the transferor had 
or had authority to convey), 8-301 (relating to the rights of a purchaser of securities). 
9-318 (relating to the rights of the assignee). The second aspect of the rule is com-
monly referred to as the "shelter" principle. When the transferor has priority over 
third party claims, the transferee will enjoy that same priority. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-401 
("Passing of Title; Reservation for Security; Limited Application of This Section"), 3-
203(a) (describing transferee's right to enforce an instrument), 7-504(1) (stating that a 
transferee acquires all rights "which his transferor had or had actual authority to con-
vey"). Thus, even if§ 9-307(1) did not provide for termination of the security inter-
est, all transferees-whether voluntary or involuntary-would be sheltered by the 
buyer's priority. For insightful discussions of the conveyancing principles that under-
lie the Code, see Permanent Editorial Board For The Uniform Commercial Code, 
PEB Commentary On The Uniform Commercial Code: Commentary 6 (Fmal Draft 
Mar. 10, 1990), reprinted in [Fmdex/PEB Commentaries] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Calla-
ghan) [hereinafter PEB Commentary 6]; John F. Dolan, The U.CC Framework: 
Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests, 59 B.U. L Rev. 811 (1979); Steven L 
Harris, The Interaction of Article 6 and 9 of dze Uniform Commercial Code: A Swdy 
in Conveyancing, Priorities, and Code Interpretation, 39 Vand. L Rev. 179 (1986). 
56. See White & Summers, supra note 45, at 172 ("[A]ppropriate protection of a 
transferee's 'market' for retransfer requires some recognition of a shelter principle."). 
57. It is important to note that a section can employ this method without using the 
word "subordination." Subordination occurs whenever the effect o( the priority rule 
is to leave the junior interest intact See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-308 {"has priority over"), 9-
310 ("takes priority over"), 9-312(5)(a) ("security interests rank according to 
priority"). 
58. Id. § 9-301(l)(b). 
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under the Code59 or she may resort to the independent foreclosure 
provisions under state lien law.60 Both alternatives will normally re-
sult in the buyer at the foreclosure sale acquiring a title that is subject 
to the senior judicial lien.61 Thus, in either case, the lien creditor re-
ceives the full protection that Article 9 gives her. 
Difficulties surface, however, when the disposition of the property 
is controlled by the judicial lien creditor. A literal reading of the 
Code may lead one to the conclusion that the buyer will not take free 
of the subordinate security interest.62 Such a conclusion, however, 
would have disastrous consequences for the judicial lien creditor. 
Consider the following illustration: 
Suppose the sheriff levies equipment worth $10,000. Just prior to 
the sale the debtor creates a $4,000 security interest, which the se-
cured party advertises at the sheriff's sale. Buyers will pay no more 
than the encumbered value of the equipment; thus, the lien creditor 
will realize only $6,000 toward satisfaction of his judgment. If the 
junior secured party had been senior in the first place, the lien credi-
tor would have realized the same $6,000 from the sheriff's sale. 
Therefore, inability to foreclose the junior security interest reverses 
the priorities and puts the senior lien creditor in the same position 
as if he had been junior.63 
59. See id. § 9-504 (providing in part that "[a] secured party after default may sell, 
lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral."). 
60. See id. § 9-501(1) (providing that a secured creditor "may reduce his claim to 
judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by any available judicial 
procedure."); see also id. § 9-501(5) (stating that a judicial lien acquired by the se-
cured party will enjoy the same priority as the security interest and the secured party 
may purchase the collateral at a judicial sale). 
61. See id. § 9-504( 4) ("When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after 
default, the disposition ... discharges the security interest under which it is made and 
any security interest or lien subordinate thereto."). If the property is sold at an execu-
tion sale, non-Code rules must also be taken into account. In several jurisdictions this 
will mean that the sale discharges al/ liens. See, e.g., Maryland Nat'! Bank v. Porter-
Way Harvester Mfg. Co., 300 A.2d 8, 11 (Del. 1972) (stating that when title is ac-
quired by the purchaser at an execution sale it is "free and clear" of all liens); Carlson, 
supra note 51, at 574 (illustrating an example where the U.C.C. and state case law 
combine to discharge both junior interests and senior judicial liens). The senior lien 
creditor is not prejudiced since its claim is satisfied first from the proceeds. Id. 
62. See Carlson, supra note 51, at 575-81. Sections 9-201, providing that a security 
agreement is effective between the parties, against purchasers and creditors, and 9-
306(2), stating that a security interest continues in collateral despite sale or other dis-
position, would seem to keep a security interest alive absent a contrary provision in 
Article 9. More than one court has searched in vain for such a provision. See, e.g., 
Tabers v. Jackson Purchase Prod. Credit Ass'n, 649 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1983) (basing its decision on a Kansas commercial law statute to find that a judicial 
sale "does not necessarily 'cleanse title.' "); Bloom v. Hilty, 234 A.2d 860, 863-64 (Pa. 
1967) (relying on § 9-312). But see In re Dean Monagin, Inc., 170 N.W.2d 924, 927 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (finding that the assignee for the benefit of creditors can sell 
free of an unperfected security interest). 
63. Carlson, supra note 51, at 578. 
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If the courts recognize that unless the lien creditor's priority e:x-tends 
to the buyer, the effect will be to repeal that priority, then the Code's 
literal language is not necessarily an insuperable o~ection to an out-
come in accord with non-Code foreclosure law. One possibili~ 
might be to permit resort to non-Code law pursuant to section 1-103. 
Another alternative is to read section 9-301(1)(b) as rebutting the pre-
sumptive immortality bestowed upon security interests by sections 9-
201 and 9-306(2).66 
In sum, a priority rule can adequately balance the legitimate inter-
ests of competing claimants only by focusing on the priority claimant's 
protectable interests and limiting the other claimant's interest to the 
extent necessary to ensure that the latter in no way devalues the 
former. Implicit in this strategy is a vital distinction between termina-
tion and subordination of the junior interest. What is crucial to under-
stand is that the appropriateness of the method chosen will depend on 
the nature of the priority interest. In short, full protection of a prior-
ity ownership interest requires that all junior interests be eliminated 
whereas creditors with priority liens require only their 
subordination. 67 
B. The Loss of Priority as a Taking 
Regardless of which method is chosen to express the secured party's 
loss of priority, there has been a taking of rights for which the party 
has specifically bargained. This raises the question of whether there 
has been a taking which mandates the payment of just compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment. It is one thing to conclude that a secur-
64. If §§ 9-201 and 9-306(2) were ignored, it is clear that under non-Code law the 
buyer at the execution sale would be sheltered by the lien creditor's priority. See 4 
American Law of Property§ 17 30, at 612 (A James Casner ed., 1952) ("(I]f the judg-
ment creditor himself was protected by the statute against unrecorded transactions, 
the purchaser at the sale obtains a good title irrespective of notice .... " (footnotes 
omitted)). 
65. U.C.C. § 1-103 provides in relevant part: "Unless displaced by the particular 
provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity .•• shall supplement [the 
Code's] provisions." But see Carlson, supra note 51, at 578 ("[S]ection 1-103 could be 
used to assert nonuniform foreclosure rules over section 9-201, but this would seri-
ously impair the general utility of section 9-201 to secured lenders."). 
66. Carlson, supra note 51, at 579-80. 
67. Strangely enough, § 9-301(1) "subordinates" an unperfected security interest 
to the interests of judicial lien creditors, secured parties and buyers. This is an appro-
priate way to treat priority lienors, but it has the effect of destroying the buyer's prior-
ity. See Carlson, supra note 51, at 552-53. Unfortunately, one court has held that an 
unperfected security interest survives a sale to a senior buyer. See Aircraft li'ading 
and Serv., Inc. v. Braniff, Inc., 819 F.2d 1227, 1233 (2d Cir. 1987). In response to this 
case, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code issued a com-
mentary which amends the Official Comment to § 9-301 to make clear that the sheller 
principle effectively terminates the junior security interest See PEB Commentary 6, 
supra note 55. 
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ity interest is "private property" under the Constitution;68 it is quite 
another thing to conclude that the loss of priority without compensa-
tion runs afoul of the takings clause. Surely it does not.69 The main 
purpose of this section is to show that the jurisprudence of takings is 
able to offer illuminating analyses of Article 9 that may offer assist-
ance in solving the problems posed by competing interests. 
Aside from the obvious statement that a " 'taking' occurs when a 
government entity formally condemns a landowner's property and ob-
tains the fee simple pursuant to its sovereign power of eminent do-
main,"70 there is no generally accepted test for determining whether a 
taking has occurred. The courts' struggle to balance the variety of 
factors involved has produced a series of "essentially ad hoc" inquir-
ies.71 Notwithstanding this confusion and inconsistency, courts do 
agree on the most fundamental point in any takings case: "the depri-
vation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a right or in-
terest to the sovereign constitutes the taking."72 
Clearly the elimination of a security interest is a taking. The se-
cured party does not simply lose a single strand from its bundle of 
property rights, it loses every strand.73 Subordination of the security 
interest, however, presents a more difficult issue. 
68. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) ("The 
constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest [in property] the citizen 
may possess."). 
69. Perhaps the most obvious way to resolve the constitutional issue is to recog-
nize that secured creditors willingly subject themselves to the vagaries of Article 9 
with a presumptive understanding of the risks involved. Cf Carol M. Rose, Mahon 
Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561, 582 
n.110 (1984) ("One reason why legislation can abate nuisances without taking prop-
erty is that property owners know that they may be enjoined from noxious uses, and 
must have built this risk into their purchase price."). 
A less obvious response to the constitutional issue relies on the concept of "average 
reciprocity of advantage." See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 
{1922). Loosely speaking, no taking occurs if the harm caused by one aspect of a 
regulation is more or less offset by a corresponding benefit to the same property 
owner. In other words, the owner's economic situation has not changed. Concep-
tually, this "wash" may be the economic consequence of the secured party's proceeds 
claim under § 9-306. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
70. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651 (1981). 
71. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 {1978); see also John A. Rumbach, A Unify-
ing Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34 
Rutgers L. Rev. 243, 244 (1982) {describing the area as somewhat illogical); Corwin 
W. Johnson, Compensation for Invalid Land-Use Regulations, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 559, 594 
{1981) {describing the area as chaotic); Patrick Wiseman, When the End Justifies the 
Means: Understanding Takings Jurisprudence in a Legal System With Integrity, 63 St. 
John's L. Rev. 433, 434 (1988) (describing the area as incoherent). 
72. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). 
73. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) 
("[T]he government does not simply take a single 'strand' from the 'bundle' of prop-
erty rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand."). Again, it 
bears repeating that this Article does not assert that a taking requires just compensa-
tion. Rather, this Article asserts that the jurisprudence of takings and of Article 9 
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In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,14 the Supreme Court applied 
the "diminution in value" test to the question of whether a 1921 Penn-
sylvania statute, which restricted the mining of anthracite coal depos-
its, unconstitutionally took property without compensation.75 In 
essence, the statute precluded property owners from releasing miners 
from their common law duty to support the surface under which they 
mined.76 Its effect was to take from some miners the subsurface min-
eral rights and support rights for which they had bargained. After 
relating the familiar assumption that "to some extent values incident 
to property" could be diminished by the exercise of the state's police 
power without there being a compensable taking,n the Court recog-
nized that at some point property will be deemed "taken" depending 
upon the magnitude and/or quantity of rights invaded. Thus the court 
found, "[O]ne fact for consideration in determining such limits is the 
extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in 
most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain 
and compensation to sustain the act. "78 
Thus, the Supreme Court has never attempted to construct a coher-
ent framework for determining how much diminution in value is suffi-
cient to constitute a taking. Without such a framework, the 
diminution in value test can easily be manipulated to make ad hoc 
discretionary judgments about the use of the state's police power.79 
The propriety of takings decisions must therefore depend upon the 
courts' willingness and ability to administer the constitutional guaran-
tee in a manner consistent with the policies that we expect that guar-
antee to serve. 
Notwithstanding the current indeterminacy of takings jurispru-
dence, analysis of the remedial and economic consequences of lien 
subordination indicates that a taking may have occurred. In many ju-
often compliment each other. The clearest way to make this point is simply to ignore 
the fact that the secured party accepts its interest with full knowledge or the risks 
involved 
74. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
75. Id. at 413. 
76. Id. at 412-13. 
77. Id. at 413. 
78. Id. 
79. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) 
("[O]ne of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property 
'whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.'" (quoting Frank L 
Michelman, Property Utility, and Fairness: Comments on rite Etltical Foundations of 
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1192 (1967))). As Carol Rose 
stated: 
When a court expands the relevant property to which the "taken" portion is 
compared, the diminution in value test emerges as a deep pocket rule, as 
holders of extensive property must suffer a greater diminuuon in value in 
order to establish a takings claim. Conversely, contracting the relevant 
property interest ... may turn every regulation into a taking. 
Rose, supra note 69, at 568. 
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risdictions, junior secured parties have been effectively proscribed 
from taking possession of their collateral. 80 Although this prohibition 
is found nowhere in the Code, courts have grafted this principle onto 
the concept of priority and held that repossession is a conversion of 
the priority creditor's interest.81 Nor is the secured creditor's loss of 
remedy its only loss.82 Furthermore, correct implementation of the 
senior lien creditor's priority depends upon the diminishment of the 
value of the subordinated lien.83 Generalizations are difficult because 
creditors vary in a myriad of ways, and thus no loss of priority will 
have exactly the same impact in two different cases. Differences in 
the total value of all available collateral and in the amount of the se-
nior debt may mean, for example, that a senior lien that would have 
the effect of denying secured status to the junior creditor in one case 
would pose no significant threat to the junior creditor's position in the 
next case. Even though we may be left guessing whether the extent of 
the diminution in value meets the required threshold for a taking, the 
effects of subordination reveal its potential to cause significant harm 
to the junior creditor's interest unless safeguards are instituted. 
C. The Contingent Nature of Security Interests and the Code's 
"Just Compensation" Principle 
A principle burden of the argument thus far has been to show that 
security interests are property. Implicit in this proposition is the 
premise that the interest should be protected by a property rule.84 
Within the conventional framework of the common law, this notion is 
inherent in the jurisprudence of property law. Yet, perhaps the most 
noteworthy comment that can be made about an Article 9 security 
interest is that it may be contingent and terminable under certain 
conditions. 
A commonly offered rationale for the contingency of security inter-
ests is that it is necessary in order to satisfy society's goal of achieving 
80. See, e.g., General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 
574 P.2d 50, 54 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a perfected security interest had 
priority over an unperfected retained security interest); International Harvester Cred-
itor Corp. v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 188 S.E.2d 110, 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1972) (finding that a purchase money security interest in a money debt did not have 
priority over the purchase money security interest in the goods, thus, first party pre-
vailed in the conversion suit); Barnett v. Everett Trust & Sav. Bank, 534 P.2d 836, 837-
38 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (finding that repossession by a successor in interest to a 
purchaser after judicial foreclosure constituted conversion). 
81. See cases cited supra note 80. 
82. For example, if the junior secured party neglects to give written notice of its 
claim to the senior secured party, it is not entitled to "reasonable notification" of a 
proposed disposition of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-504(3). Neither is the junior party 
entitled to a distribution of excess proceeds. See U.C.C. § 9-504(1). 
83. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
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efficient outcomes.85 Perhaps most significantly, contingency pro-
motes efficiency by facilitating the integrity of the marketplace. For 
example, consider the protection afforded to the buyer in ordinary 
course who purchases from inventory. The buyer will take free of all 
security interests "created by his seller."86 The ordinary course of 
business rule is justified by its minimization of transaction costs to fa-
cilitate economic exchange. Buyers are no longer required to search 
for outstanding liens. To require otherwise necessarily would inter-
fere with the efficiency of the market because of the large volume of 
purchases from inventory and the fact that in the vast majority of 
cases the sale has been authorized by the secured party.87 As Profes-
sor Grant Gilmore has noted, the good faith purchaser "is protected 
not because of his praiseworthy character, but to the end that com-
mercial transactions may be engaged in without elaborate investiga-
tion of property rights and in reliance on the possession of property by 
one who offers it for sale or to secure a loan. "88 
The contingency of security interests raises the question of principle 
concern here: whether the secured party is justly compensated for the 
taking?89 The discussion of compensation might be generalized by 
supposing once again that the transaction at issue involves the 
purchase from inventory by a buyer in the ordinary course of business. 
Although the original security interest terminates, subsections (1) and 
(2) of section 9-306 provide for the automatic attachment of the secur-
ity interest to proceeds.90 In other words, the Code gives the secured 
85. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 3 (arguing that legal rules should balance 
the risk of loss between prior owners and subsequent owners); Thomas H. Jackson & 
Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Fmancing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 Yale LJ. 
1143 (1979) (examining the priority rules of Article 9); Alan Schwartz. A Theory of 
Loan Priorities, 18 J. Legal Stud. 209 (1989) (advocating the abolition of the "first in 
time is first in right" principle in creditor law). 
86. U.C.C. § 9-307(1). For a thoughtful discussion of the section's "created by his 
seller" requirement, see \Vtlliam H. Lawrence, Tlze "Created by His Seller" Limitation 
of Section 9-307(1) of the U.C.C.: A Provision in Need of an Artic11/ated Policy, 60 
Ind. LJ. 73 (1984). 
87. If the disposition of the collateral is authorized by the secured party, the secur-
ity interest will terminate pursuant to § 9-306(2). See supra note 54. The section has 
been rationalized in terms of waiver. See Swift & Co. v. Jamestown Nat'l Bank. 426 
F.2d 1099, 1103-04 (8th Cir. 1970). 
88. Grant Gilmore, Tlze Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith P11rclzase, 63 Yale 
LJ. 1057, 1057 (1954). See also Barkley Oark, The Law of Secured Transactions 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 3.04 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that section 9-
307(1) "encourages the marketability of goods and supports the reliance interest of 
buyers who assume that they have clear title to the goods they purchase."). 
89. This cursory explanation for the contingency of security interests is intended to 
suggest that there are principled reasons which justify treating security interests differ-
ently from other property interests. One qualification is necessary here. In this sec-
tion, the concern is with only those takings of security interests which can be said to 
occur at the very moment that the competing interest comes into existence. Later this 
Article will address takings that occur sometime after the competing interest is ac-
quired. See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text 
90. Section 9-306 states that 
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party a substituted property interest in any items received by the 
debtor upon the disposition of the contractually granted collateral.91 
Thus, one can conclude that the secured party has been justly compen-
sated for its loss. 92 
The question of just compensation is somewhat more difficult when 
the secured party's interest is "taken" without a corresponding dispo-
sition of the collateral. What is important to appreciate about the cur-
rent scope of the term "proceeds" under section 9-306 is that it has a 
transactional focus. The secured party obtains a security interest in 
anything received upon the "sale, exchange, collection or other dispo-
sition of" the collateral.93 Accordingly, most courts have taken the 
position that the debtor must have transferred title to the collateral 
before an asset can be classified as proceeds of that collateral.94 This 
has, for example, led to a series of decisions which have denied 
proceeds status to such items as lease payments,95 and cash 
(1) "Proceeds" includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collec-
tion or other disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by rea-
son of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that 
it is payable to a person other than a party to the security agreement. 
Money, checks, deposit accounts, and the like are "cash proceeds." All 
other proceeds are "non-cash proceeds." 
(2) Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest contin-
ues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof 
unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security 
agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds in-
cluding collections received by the debtor. 
u.c.c. § 9-306(1)-(2). 
91. In fact, the claim to proceeds is automatic and is in no way dependent upon 
the presence of a proceeds clause in the security agreement. See id. § 9-203(3) ("Un-
less otherwise agreed a security agreement gives the secured party the rights to pro-
ceeds provided by Section 9-306."). Moreover, if the security interest in the original 
collateral does not terminate upon its disposition, the secured party will be able to 
pursue both that collateral and its proceeds. Of course, while the value of both items 
is available, the secured party can have only one satisfaction. See id. § 9-306 cmt. 3. 
92. Just compensation under the takings clause is "market value fairly deter-
mined," Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934), or "what a willing buyer 
would pay in cash to a willing seller" at the time of the taking. United States v. Miller, 
317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). It is probably safe to assume that the proceeds received by 
the debtor upon a sale of the collateral will closely approximate this standard. 
93. u.c.c. § 9-306(1). 
94. See, e.g., In re Hastie, 2 F.3d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[E)ach of the fore-
going events describes an event whereby one asset is disposed of and another is ac-
quired as its substitute."). 
95. See, e.g., In re Cleary Brothers Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 40, 41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1980) ("Had the Sponsors intended ... to include rent for temporary use of collateral 
... they would have included the term 'leased.' "); In re Corpus Cristi Hotel Partners, 
133 B.R. 850, 855 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991) (finding that hotel revenues are not pro· 
ceeds). But see In re Investment Hotel Properties, 109 B.R. 990, 995 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1990) (finding that payment for the use of hotel rooms is proceeds post-petition); In re 
Southern Equip. Sales Co., 24 B.R. 788, 794 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982) (finding that lease 
payments on equipment are proceeds). The Permanent Editorial Board for the 
U.C.C. has taken the position that the right to receive rentals is proceeds: 
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dividends.96 
Examples of such denials of proceeds status include subordination 
of the security interest to a later-in-time judicial lien creditor97 and 
subordination to a later-in-time secured party.98 In these cases the 
Code provides no compensation.99 This uncompensated taking is, in 
significant part, an effort to promote the public notice features of Ar-
ticle 9.100 If subordination serves as the motivation for public notice, 
perfection of the security interest ordinarily would provide the se-
cured party with the necessary protection against loss. 
Where a debtor has granted to a secured party a security interest in goods 
that the debtor later leases as lessor, the lease rentals would constitute pro-
ceeds of the secured party's collateral for the reason that the debtor's con-
veyance of a leasehold interest in the goods constitutes a disposition of the 
goods for purposes of§ 9-306(1). 
PEB Commentary On The Uniform Commercial Code: Commentary No. 9, reprinted 
in [Findex/PEB Commentaries] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) [hereinafter PEB 
Commentary 9]. 
96. See, e.g., In re Hastie, 2 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that the 
receipt of cash dividends is not within the definition of proceeds). Courts have drawn 
a distinction between ordinary cash dividends and a liquidating dividend. The latter 
would seem to be proceeds. See, e.g., Aycock v. Texas Commerce Bank. N.A., 127 
B.R 17, 19 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991) (finding that where the principal is proceeds, the 
secured party is entitled to interest earned on liquidating dividends). 
97. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b). 
98. See, e.g., id. § 9-312(5) ("Conflicting security interests rank according to prior-
ity in time of filing or perfection."). Because the later-in-time secured party has pre-
filed pursuant to § 9-401(1), its lien is perfected the moment it attaches. However, if 
the later-in-time secured party has not pre-filed, the case resembles that of lapsed 
perfection. Consider the following: D grants security interests in the same equipment 
to Secured Party-1 (SP-1) and Secured Party-2 (SP-2), respectively. If both security 
interests initially are unperfected, SP-l's security interest will have priority pursuant 
to the § 9-312(5)(b) first-to-attach rule. However, SP-l's priority is not necessarily 
permanent. If SP-2 proceeded to file first, it would achieve priority by operation or 
§ 9-312(5)(a)'s first-to-file or perfect rule. 
Although the scope of this Article is limited to cases where the first-in-time secured 
party was initially perfected, it should be pointed out that there is no obvious theoreti-
cal justification for SP-l's loss of priority in the foregoing hypothetical. Arguably 
such an outcome encourages prompt filing, while underscoring the perceived benefits 
of Article 9's public notice rules. That argument, however, is not persuasive. Fust, 
§ 9-312 does not appear to have been designed to protect the basic eA"PCCtations or 
SP-2. Though SP-2 might have fixed its expectations based on the absence of a filing 
by SP-1, that assumption does not support a priority rule based on time or filing. In 
the hypothetical given, if SP-1 files first, but subsequent to SP-2's security interest, SP-
1 will have priority, notwithstanding SP-2's reliance. If this law is intended to protect 
SP-2, it is ineffective. 
99. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
100. Both §§ 9-301(1)(b) and 9-312(5) are race priority provisions. Once these-
cured party takes the steps necessary to perfect its interest, subsequent lien creditors 
and secured parties cannot prevail. This approach implicitly assumes that publicizing 
a security interest advances important values. It has been said, for example, that pub-
lication permits the efficient movement of goods by reducing the UUlnocent purchaser 
risk." See Harold R Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics, and Negotiability of Goods, 9 
J. Legal Stud. 569, 570 n.7 (1980). 
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In most cases, a perfected security interest will not be subordinated 
to later-in-time claimants. There are, however, exceptions. If the col-
lateral is negotiable or "quasi" negotiable paper, even a perfected se-
cured party may risk subordination.101 In addition to requiring public 
notice of a security interest, this outcome represents a general effort 
to promote the free alienability of a particular type of property. In 
such a case the secured party usually can protect itself. The official 
comments to section 9-308 reflect this idea by suggesting that a se-
cured party "who wishes to leave the paper in the debtor's possession 
can . . . protect himself against purchasers by stamping or noting on 
the paper the fact that it has been assigned to him."102 
A general conclusion emerges from the discussion: The Code pro-
vides compensation to secured parties when the particular context 
suggests that the taking cannot reasonably be avoided. For example, 
when the security interest is in inventory held for sale, there is usually 
little that the secured party can do to preserve its lien.103 A security 
interest does not survive a sale if the secured party somehow author-
ized the disposition.104 This result is the natural outcome in the case 
of inventory. Also, even when a sale of inventory is unauthorized, 
section 9-307(1) will protect all buyers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. In either event, although the secured party loses its interest in 
the inventory and has no further claim to it, the party still has claim to 
proceeds. 
The same concern for the secured party also arises when, for some 
other reason, the security interest is the subject of an unavoidable tak-
ing. This latter category includes all cases where there has been an 
unauthorized disposition of the collateral105 and cases where the col-
101. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-308 ("Purchase of Chattel Paper and Instruments."), 9-
309 ("Protection of Purchasers of Instruments, Documents, and Securities."). The 
Code provides for subordination of a perfected security interest in several other cases. 
These cases, however, are unlikely to occur. See id. § 9-313(4),(7) (providing, in part, 
that a non-purchase money security interest will be subordinate to a prior recorded 
interest of an encumbrancer of the real estate). A subordination may occur where the 
new priority clainlant has caused the collateral to appreciate in value. See id. § 9-310 
("Priority of Certain Liens Arising by Operation of Law."). 
102. Id. § 9-308 cmt. 3. Of course, an uncompensated taking would only occur if 
the purchaser is a secured party. See id. § 1-201(32) ("'Purchase' includes taking by 
sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien .... "). If the paper were sold, its 
"disposition" would give rise to a proceeds clainl. 
103. In situations where the secured party wishes maximum protection against 
debtor misconduct, it can setup a "field warehouse" or use a more modern arrange-
ment known as a "certified (or 'verified') inventory control." But either method will 
add to the cost of the loan and may, therefore, be impractical. See generally James T. 
McGuire, The Impact of the UCC on Field Warehousing, 6 UCC L.J. 267, 277-83 
{1974) (discussing the impact of Article 9 on the existence and importance of field 
warehousing). 
104. u.c.c. § 9-306(2). 
105. While the nature of the disposition as authorized or not will have no effect on 
the secured party's right to proceeds, it may, however, dictate whether the security 
interest will continue in the original collateral. See id. 
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lateral has been processed or com.mingled.106 Consequently, the Code 
provides a coherent and unitary framework for preserving the value of 
the creditor's security interest. The Code does not proscribe every 
taking of a secured party's property, only those without just 
compensation. 
m. THE LAPSED PERFECT10N DoCTRINE 
The implications of the implicit takings jurisprudence of Article 9 
for the lapsed perfection doctrine are fairly straightforward. The 
lapsed perfection controversy, in fact, is one that permits an unusually 
easy application of takings jurisprudence. 
The doctrine of lapsed perfection fails in most respects to conform 
to the fundamental values inherent in the Code's approach to takings. 
Moreover, accepting that the Code implicitly reflects a jurisprudence 
of takings undermines the vision of commercial rationality inherent in 
the treatment that lapsed perfection has received under the Code. 
The nature and reach of the lapsed perfection doctrine can best be 
understood by considering several contexts in which it is likely to be-
come relevant.107 This Article contends that the proper solutions to 
all lapsed perfection problems can be derived from the compensation 
principle of Article 9, and that these solutions are the only practical 
means of resolving the dilemma without disrupting the scheme of pri-
orities and expectations established by the Code. 
A. Section 9-103: Multiple-State Transactions 
Section 9-103(1) provides that a security interest in ordinary 
goods,108 if perfected in state X, continues to be perfected after the 
debtor moves the goods into state Y until either the state X perfection 
expires or four months elapse, whichever occurs first. 109 The follow-
106. Where the collateral has been processed or commingled, the secured party will 
be compensated by being able to lay claim to the resulting product or mass. See gener-
ally David Frisch, UCC Section 9-315: A Historical and Modern Perspective, 10 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1, 24-28 (1985) (arguing that a pre-confusion purchase money security interest 
in goods should continue in a confused mass). 
107. This part of the Article is not intended as an exhaustive list of these contexts 
but rather as a demonstration of their number and variety. 
108. "Ordinary goods" in§ 9-103 is a residual category which includes goods "other 
than those covered by a certificate of title described in subsection (2), mobile goods 
described in subsection (3), and minerals described in subsection (5)." U.C.C. § 9-
103(1)(a). 
109. U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d) provides in relevant part: 
When collateral is brought into and kept in this state while subject to a se-
curity interest perfected under the law of the jurisdiction from which the 
collateral was removed, the security interest remains perfected, but if action 
is required by Part 3 of this Article to perfect the security interest. 
(i) if the action is not taken before the expiration of the period of perfec-
tion in the other jurisdiction or the end of four months after the collateral is 
brought into this state, whichever period first expires, the security interest 
becomes unperfected at the end of that period and is thereafter deemed to 
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ing sequence of events can be used to demonstrate how some lapsed 
perfection priority issues might arise:110 
March 1 - Secured Party-1 (SP-1) perfects (by filing) a security 
interest in state X. 
April 1 - The debtor moves the collateral to state Y. 
May 15 - L acquires a judicial lien on the collateral in state Y or 
Debtor sells the collateral to B in state Y or 
Secured Party-2 (SP-2) perfects security interest in the 
collateral in state Y. 
Assume that SP-1 never reperfects its security interest 
in state Y. What is the result? 
In each case, it is clear that SP-1 had priority for the four months 
immediately following the removal of the collateral to state Y, and 
that its priority would have continued had it refiled before the end of 
that period.111 The question is whether SP-l's priority is permanent, 
notwithstanding its failure to file in state Y, i.e., after its perfection 
lapsed.112 This issue became particularly pronounced before the 1972 
revision of Article 9 took effect. Prior to 1972, the Code provided no 
clear answer, and the law thus reflected a puzzling and relatively ad 
hoc set of outcomes about when a priority once gained could be 
lost.113 All this has changed. 
have been unperfected as against a person who became a purchaser after 
removal; (ii) if the action is taken before the expiration of the period speci-
fied in subparagraph (i), the security interest continues perfected thereafter 
u.c.c. § 9-103(1)(d). 
110. The lapsed perfection issues under § 9-103(1) will all involve the transporta-
tion of collateral because the choice of law rule adopted thereunder is the law of the 
location of the collateral. With other types of collateral (accounts, general in-
tangibles, mobile goods, and sometimes chattel paper) lapse problems might arise 
when the debtor relocates. These problems can occur because the location of the 
debtor dictates the choice of law rule for filing. See id. § 9-103(3)-( 4). The universe of 
lapse issues that are possible under § 9-103 can also arise following the intrastate 
movement of collateral or relocation of the debtor in those states which have adopted 
alternative subsection (3) to § 9-401. 
111. See supra note 109. 
112. Another way of asking the same question is whether the four-month period is 
a grace period or is an absolute period of protection of the secured party's interest. If 
viewed as a grace period, the failure of the secured party to file within four months 
would mean that its security interest would be deemed unperfected from the moment 
the collateral entered the state. Indeed, grace periods can be found in Article 9. See, 
e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2) (giving a secured party that files within ten days after the 
debtor takes possession of the collateral priority over the rights of certain transferees 
between the time of attachment and perfection), 9-312(4) (stating that a purchase 
money security interest in collateral has priority over a conflicting interest in the col-
lateral if perfected at the time the debtor takes possession). 
113. A New York court was one of the first courts to hold that the four-month 
period was not a grace period for filing. See Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A.C. Lohman, 
Inc., 229 N.Y.S.2d 570, 577 (App. Div. 1962). In Churchill Motors, the court ruled 
that § 9-103 allowed the secured party four months of absolute perfection. Id. For 
identical holdings see also, Frrst Nat'l Bank v. Stamper, 225 A.2d 162, 169 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1966) (stating that the four-month period is intended to provide suffi-
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The 1972 Code's approach to these cases can be summarized as fol-
lows: if the secured party's perfection lapses because it delays beyond 
the four-month period, its interest will be subject to defeat by anyone 
who purchased the collateral during that period.114 Thus, returning to 
the foregoing hypothetical, under the 1972 approach, SP-1 would con-
tinue to have priority over L; it would have its interest terminated in 
favor of B; and it would have its interest subordinated to that of SP-
2.115 This result presents the appropriate question: What is the theo-
retical justification for the reversal of priorities with respect to B and 
SP-2? 
It is fair to assume that the primary reason for SP-1 's loss of priority 
is to protect third parties other than B and SP-2. This becomes appar-
ent if we recognize that, notwithstanding their reliance on the absence 
of a filing by SP-1 in state Y, SP-1 would continue to have priority if it 
cient time for investigation and location of the collateral); Newton-Waltham Bank 
and Trust Co. v. Bergen Motors, Inc., 327 N.Y.S2d 77, 81 (Civ. CL 1971) (stating that 
during the four-month period there is absolute protection throughout the nation while 
the party searches for the missing property); Al Marcone Ford, Inc. v. Manheim Auto 
Auction, Inc., 208 A2d 290, 293 (Pa. Super. CL 1965) (stating that failure to file dur-
ing the four-month period does not affect the secured party's status); Morris v. Seat-
tle-First Nat'l Bank, 516 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Wash. CL App. 1973) (stating that a secured 
interest continues to be perfected for the first four months regardless of whether the 
secured party complied with state procedures). But see United States v. Squires, 378 
F. Supp. 798, 804 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (holding that a party who does not perfect its 
security interest after a lapse of four months has a junior interest to the buyer for 
value); Arrow Ford, Inc. v. Western Landscape Constr. Co .• 532 P.2d 553. 558 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1975) (choosing to adopt a conditional protection interpretation of the 1962 
provision). 
114. See supra note 109 for the text of§ 9-103{l){d). 
115. Whether or not a party is a purchaser will depend upon whether she acquired 
her interest in property in a voluntary transaction. See U.C.C. § 1-201(32)-(33). Ac-
cordingly, only B and SP-2 will have their respective priorities reversed after lapse. 
See Review Committee for Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Permanent 
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Fmal Report. Appendix: Gen-
eral Comment on the Approach of the Review Committee of Article 9, at 193, 245 
(Apr. 25, 1971) [hereinafter Final Report] ("The negative inference is that judgment 
lienors remain subordinate."). But see Prairie State Bank v. IRS., 745 P.2d 966, 971 
(Ariz. CL App. 1987) (holding that§ 9-103(1)(d) protects intervening lien creditors, 
regardless of whether they are purchasers). It is unknown why the drafters decided to 
treat lienors differently from purchasers. Whenever SP-1 is provided with absolute 
protection against the claims of intervening lien creditors, however, it obviates 
problems that SP-1 might otherwise encounter under section 544(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. See 48 A.L.I. Proceedings 256-60 (1972). 
Because B now owns the collateral free of SP-l's interest. it should also follow that 
any claim SP-1 might have had for conversion, will vanish \vith its priority. See text 
accompanying supra note 81. It would be peculiar if SP-1 were still permitted to re-
cover the value of the collateral from B. The Review Committee for Article 9, in an 
attempt to rationalize this puzzling outcome, characterizes the situation in terms of 
priority only. See Final Report, supra, at 237 ("While technically the conversion was 
complete at the time of purchase, it is to be hoped that the proposed clarification of 
the effect of lapse will cause similar cases to be analyzed in the future in terms of 
priority, not of conversion."). 
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files within the four-month period.116 If the Code intended to protect 
the expectations of B and SP-2, the rule would be otherwise.117 But 
concern for third parties misses the simple point that their respective 
priority is independent of how SP-1 fares against Band SP-2. For ex-
ample, regardless of the relative priority of SP-1 and SP-2 inter se, one 
who buys the collateral after the perfection of SP-l's interest lapses 
will take free of that interest. Therefore, a reversal of priorities is not 
necessary to protect the buyer against SP-1 because its priority is as-
sured by section 9-301(l)(c). Consequently, there is no apparent rea-
son why the lapsed filing should cause SP-1 to lose its original priority 
over any third party, including purchasers.118 
Perhaps most important, the drafters' approach to the problem of 
lapse in section 9-103(l)(d) runs afoul of the Code's takings jurispru-
dence. To the extent that SP-l's security interest is subordinated to 
the interest of SP-2, there has been a taking for which no compensa-
tion has been provided. This result occurs because the transaction be-
tween the debtor and SP-2 has failed to generate any proceeds to 
which SP-1 's security interest could attach.119 
116. If SP-1 makes a timely filing in the removal jurisdiction (within the four-month 
period) its security interest continues to be perfected without interruption under 
U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d). With no break in perfection, the security interest will have pri-
ority over the later-acquired interests ofB and SP-2. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301(1)(c), 
9-306(2), 9-312(5). 
117. A major consequence of the four-month rule is that fraudulent debtors can go 
a long way towards making a filing disappear simply by taking goods across state 
lines. Thus, an innocent third party who wishes to acquire an interest in the collateral 
must assure herself that the goods have been in-state for a least four months or she 
must check (assuming this information can be obtained) for a filing in every state 
where the debtor does or has done business. If the primary objectives of Article 9 
were to reduce the risk to third parties and their information acquisition costs, one 
might consider treating the security interest as unperfected the moment the collateral 
leaves the state in which the secured party filed. 
118. Some have suggested that the conditional priority approach of§ 9-103 is nec-
essary in order to eliminate circular priority problems in the case of purchasers. See, 
e.g., D. Fenton Adams, The 1972 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Analysis of Conflict of Laws Provisions, 45 Miss. LJ. 281, 330-31 (1974) (stating that 
the four-month rule eliminates some of the circular priority problems); Paul J. Petit, 
Choice of Law Under Article Nine of the UCC, 7 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 641, 661-62 (1976) 
("[I]t is clear that the only reasonable conclusion is that the perfection bestowed by 
the four-month grace period of 9-103(3) is conditional upon filing in the state to which 
the goods have been removed within the four-month period."). To be sure, a condi-
tional approach to lapse is a viable method for untangling the circular priority dispute 
that would arise if the Code permitted SP-1 to retain its priority. (SP-1 is senior to 
SP-2; SP-2 is senior to the buyer; the buyer is senior to SP-1). But until we have some 
idea of the costs that such a situation would generate, we cannot say that SP-l's loss of 
priority is warranted. See Pearson, supra note 9, at 43 n.131 ("The avoidance of [the 
circular priority] problem should never become the sole rationale supporting the im-
position of conditional protection upon a secured party."); see also infra notes 128-30 
and accompanying text (discussing the problems with circular priority). 
119. This is because there has been no "sale, exchange, collection or other disposi-
tion of collateral .... " U.C.C. § 9-306(1). 
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By contrast, the sale to B does give rise to proceeds which are avail-
able to SP-1, at least in theory, and which arguably legitimize the tak-
ing. This view, however, completely ignores the crucial fact that SP-1 
is presumptively unaware of the debtor's activities and is in no posi-
tion to protect its interest in those proceeds. After all, the underlying 
premise of section 9-103(1)(d) is that the secured party needs four 
months to discover that the collateral has been removed.120 Upon 
comparison, therefore, a fundamental difference exists between a sale 
by the debtor within the initial four-month period and a sale after the 
expiration of that period. Only in the latter situation were the drafters 
willing to presume that the secured party would be able to assert an 
effective claim to proceeds. This explains why a rule which makes SP-
l's original priority over B absolute logically discriminates between B 
and a buyer who purchases the collateral after the filing in state X has 
lapsed.121 
To summarize, the drafters' decision to treat purchasers differently 
from lien creditors in section 9-103(1)(d) is seriously flawed because 
in neither case will the secured party be compensated for the resultant 
taking.122 Implicit in the four-month rule is an assumption that during 
that period the secured party has lost track of its collateral. Thus, 
even if a transaction with the debtor prior to lapse gives rise to pro-
ceeds, it is unlikely that the secured party will be in a position to lay 
claim to them. The implication of this view is that in the conte>..1: of 
section 9-103, all pre-lapse priorities should be preserved post-lapse. 
120. See U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 7 (''The four-month period is long enough for a se-
cured party to discover in most cases that the collateral has been removed and refile 
in this state .... "). 
121. Indeed, the idea of discriminating against pre- and post-lapse buyers is particu-
larly troublesome to some courts. For example, the Indiana Court of Appeals 
emphasized: 
[T]he absolute protection construction works a blatant inequity in the case 
of an innocent purchaser who by misfortune happens to purchase the collat-
eral three months and thirty days after removal. Had the unknowing pur-
chaser waited one more day to buy, he would take priority over the secured 
party. His unwitting purchase at the wrong time, however, permanently sub-
ordinates hint to the security holder. 
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pefley, 458 N.E.2d 257, 264 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1983). This Article concedes that this is a compelling hypothetical. But rationality of 
rules cannot always be assessed through formal criteria of consistency. Appeals to 
formal consistency of outcomes must be jettisoned to develop more meaningful ap-
proaches to a problem. This Article has shown that there is a conceptual difference 
between the two buyers. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18. A bright-line test 
is justified in these circumstances because any other test would undermine the cer-
tainty of application which this context requires. 
122. But cf. Pearson, supra note 9, at 45 ("Section 9-103(1)(d) produces thoroughly 
acceptable results in priority conflicts generated by the removal of collateral from one 
state to another."). 
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B. Section 9-403: The Effectiveness of a Financing Statement 
Subsections (2) and (3) of section 9-403 provide that the effective-
ness of a filed financing statement lapses after five years unless the 
secured party files a continuation statement within six months prior to 
the end of the five-year period.123 As in the case of multiple state 
transactions, the failure of the secured party to take the action neces-
sary to maintain its perfection may potentially impact existing priori-
ties. To illustrate, assume: 
March 1, 1990 - Secured Party-1 (SP-1) perfects (by filing) a 
security interest in equipment. 
April 1, 1994 - L acquires a judicial lien on the collateral or 
Debtor sells the collateral to B or 
Secured Party-2 (SP-2) perfects a security inter-
est in the collateral. 
March 15, 1995 - SP-1 has never filed a continuation statement. 
What should be done post-lapse about SP-l's pre-lapse priority over 
all three parties?124 Concern and debate over the drafters' intended 
solution to this problem ended with the 1972 version of section 9-
403(2).125 This section now provides that "[i]f the security interest be-
comes unperfected upon lapse, it is deemed to have been unperfected 
as against a person who became a purchaser or lien creditor before 
lapse."126 
Some strongly support this rule of conditional protection, at least in 
the case of intervening, pre-lapse purchasers. Michael Pearson, for 
example, concludes that resolving the issue in this way protects those 
"reliance" third parties who do not anticipate that the purchased 
property is encumbered by an existing security interest.127 Those who 
123. U.C.C. § 9-403(2)-(3). The five-year period of filing effectiveness is inapplica-
ble if the debtor is a transmitting utility or if a real estate mortgage serves as a fixture 
filing. In the former case, the filing is effective until a termination statement is filed. 
Id. § 9-403(6). In the latter case, the filing is effective until the mortgage is termi-
nated. Id. 
124. SP-1 has priority by virtue of U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301(1)(a)-(c), 9-312(5). 
125. The 1962 version of§ 9-403(2) simply stated that "[u)pon such lapse the secur-
ity interest becomes unperfected." Id. § 9-403(2) (1962). In comment 3, however, the 
drafters stated that after lapse, the security interest can be defeated by those persons 
who take priority over an unperfected security interest. Id. Because a second secured 
party is such a person, see id. §§ 9-30l(l)(a), 9-312(5), several courts held that an 
intervening subordinated secured party steps-up in priority after lapse. See, e.g., East-
ern Ind. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Farmers State Bank, 287 N.E.2d 824, 826 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1972) (holding that a party with a conflicting subordinated perfected security 
interest takes priority after lapse); Morse Electro Prods. Corp. v. Beneficial Indus. 
Loan Co., 579 P.2d 1341, 1343-44 (Wash.1978) (same). Not all commentators agreed. 
See, e.g., Comment, Section 9-103 and the Interstate Movement of Goods, 9 B.C. Indus. 
& Com. L. Rev. 72, 84-85 (1967) (disputing the proposition that a conflicting 
subordinated perfected security interest takes priority over an out-of-state secured 
creditor who does not perfect his interest within the four-month period). 
126. u.c.c. § 9-403(2). 
127. Pearson, supra note 9, at 23-24. 
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rely on the expectations of pre-lapse purchasers to advocate a reor-
dering of priorities, however, forget that when these intervening inter-
ests were first acquired SP-1 had priority. When subordination is the 
outcome, absent lapse, no other outcome after lapse can be said to 
reflect the original expectations of the parties. In these cases, no co-
herent notion of advancing the priorities of particular parties can be 
constructed out of a preference to protect expectations. 
The only hint given by the drafters for their policy choice in section 
9-403(2) is the statement in comment 3 that the rule selected "avoids 
the circular priority which arose under some prior statutes."128 Yet, 
this type of conflict occurs more infrequently than typically assumed 
in discussions of proposed solutions to the problem.129 Moreover, 
when these conflicts do arise, courts and commentators have provided 
us with a variety of simple techniques for breaking the circle.130 
Rules chosen for no other reason than to avoid circular disputes, 
therefore, cannot be represented as desirable. Because this objective 
should not dictate the proper solution to lapse issues, thinking in such 
terms makes it impossible to consider whether a particular decision to 
reverse priorities was rational-that is, whether it was based on nor-
matively persuasive conceptions of the appropriateness of devaluing 
SP-l's interest. 
Respect for property rights demands discrimination in the selection 
of outcomes after lapse. Lien creditor and purchaser cases are ini-
tially distinguishable. In the lien creditor case, no proceeds are taken 
in return. This is a provocative challenge to the legitimacy of the con-
ditional protection rule of section 9-403(2). If the arguments regard-
ing expectations and circular priority do not e>..-plain the section's 
approach, there is little reason to believe that there are any policies 
which would, in this context, outweigh the social interest in preserving 
the secured party's property interest. 
128. U.C.C. § 9-403(2) cmt 3. 
129. See Pearson, supra note 9, at 15 ("Circular priority systems created by lapsed 
filings have been extremely rare in the last half century .... "). 
130. See, e.g., In re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 1956) 
(discussing approaches taken by various courts to lien subordination in bankruptcy 
context); Hoag v. Sayre, 33 NJ. Eq. 552, 562 (NJ. Ch. 1881) (Dixon. J., dissenting) 
(stating that where senior party fails to comply with registry laws the effect is not that 
junior parties supplant the senior, but that the senior's lien is void as to the junior); In 
re 250 Bell Road, 388 A.2d 297, 300 (Pa. 1978) (resolving circuity problem by applying 
the Pennsylvania temporal priority rule); Carville D. Benson, Jr., Circuity of Lien-A 
Problem in Priorities, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 139, 153 (1935) (proposing as a solution to the 
circuity problem that all claimants be treated as junior lienholders); Albert Kocourek, 
Note, Diversities De La Ley: A First-Rate Legal Puzzle-A Problem in Priorities, 29 
ill. L. Rev. 952, 955 (1935) (solving circuity problem by resort to the parties' legiti-
mate expectations). See generally 2 Grant Gilmore, Security Interests In Personal 
Property 1020-46 (1965) (proposing solutions and describing several approaches to 
litigation of priorities). 
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When one shifts from lien creditors (whose transactions with the 
debtor never produce proceeds) to intervening purchasers, interject-
ing greater contingency into the realm of security interests may be 
acceptable. The case for a rule of conditional protection will properly 
tum, at least in part, upon whether proceeds are directly attributable 
to the disposition of the collateral. Keep in mind that "purchasers" 
can take many forms.131 SP-2 is one form of purchaser. The earlier 
critique of intervening secured parties is applicable here.132 The law 
should not elevate SP-2 to a position of priority because its transaction 
with the debtor produces no proceeds. 
Consequently, the conditional approach in the case of B might well 
be defended on the ground that its transaction with the debtor did 
produce proceeds that were directly attributable to the original collat-
eral. But we have seen that sometimes a secured party cannot plausi-
bly be expected to learn of the disposition in time to protect its 
interest. In these circumstances, the economic value of the proceeds 
claim is insufficient compensation for the loss of priority.133 The reso-
lution of the compensation issue calls for an inquiry into something 
other than whether there is a transactional link between the original 
collateral and the debtor's acquisition of new property. In examining 
those other considerations, reference to considerations of both fact 
and policy must be made. 
A secured party's ability to reach proceeds is never certain because 
it always depends on their being identified as such.134 Sometimes 
identification fails because of the debtor's misbehavior. For example, 
in many instances where the collateral is sold without the secured 
party's authorization, the debtor most likely did so with the specific 
intention of absconding with or somehow dissipating the proceeds. 
Here the secured party would have to act promptly to protect its inter-
est. Even if the sale was authorized, unanticipated consequences are 
common. For example, the nature of the collateral may exacerbate 
the secured party's risks. This is a particularly acute problem in the 
context of cash proceeds. If the proceeds have been commingled with 
other funds, a secured party who cannot use a tracing device to make 
them "identifiable" will not be able to claim them as his own.135 
131. See supra note 102. 
132. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. 
133. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. 
134. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1). 
135. Except for the statement in § 9-306 cmt. 2 that for insolvency proceedings 
"[p]aragraphs 4(a) through (c) substitute specific rules of identification for general 
principles of tracing," there is nothing in the Code to suggest that the drafters in-
tended that the unidentifiable could be made identifiable by resort to fictional tracing. 
Despite this silence, most courts have allowed the secured party to identify commin-
gled monies by using the lowest intermediate balance method of tracing. See, e.g., 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 F.2d 998, 1002 (7th Ctr. 
1974) ("[E]xaniining the language of the Code, in light of its purpose, we conclude 
that the more reasonable implication is that the proceeds may be identifiable, and the 
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Moreover, if cash proceeds are paid out by the debtor in the ordinary 
course of its business, anyone who receives the payment without 
knowledge or reason to know of the secured party's interest will take 
free of that interest.136 
All this might suggest that a more accurate approach to the com-
pensation question would be to decide in each case whether the se-
cured party has a realistic chance of reaching the proceeds. Whatever 
the abstract merits of a particularized inquiry into the specifics of each 
case may confer, there are too many individual contexts and factual 
settings for this idea to lend itself well to implementation.137 A more 
manageable approach would be to determine under what circum-
stances the risk 'vill be so exceptionally high that the secured party's 
interest in proceeds will not be viable. When relatively high risk ex-
ists, the rules of Article 9 can be adjusted accordingly. For example, 
the drafters recognized that the interstate relocation of collateral is a 
factor that can thwart even the most diligent secured party. For this 
very reason, the secured party is given four months to track down its 
collateral and take whatever lawful action it deems appropriate.138 
The goal is to detect situations like the foregoing, which are reason-
ably reliable indicators of when a secondary claim to proceeds is un-
likely to constitute effective compensation. 
Where, as in the preceding example, proceeds from the disposition 
of collateral have not changed location, the situation involves pre-
cisely the type of circumstances the drafters contemplated when they 
decided to provide for the automatic attachment of the security inter-
est to proceeds.139 If the sale of the original collateral was authorized 
by the secured party, it would not be unreasonable to assume that a 
monitoring system had been established to inform the secured party 
of when the sale occurred. In such circumstances, the ability of the 
secured party to deal effectively with the proceeds ought to be pre-
sumed. Therefore, a rule terminating the security interest in favor of 
security interest therein survive, even though commingled."); Universal C.I.T. Credit 
Corp. v. Farmers Banlc, 358 F. Supp. 317, 324 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (stating that the mere 
fact that the proceeds from the sale of the assets were commingled with other funds 
and withdrawals were made from those funds does not make the proceeds unidentifi-
able); C.O Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip., Inc., 431 N.E.2d 370, 372 (Ill. 1982) 
(stating that the lowest intermediate balance approach is a common sense method of 
identifying fungible proceeds). 
136. U.C.C. § 9-306 cmt. 2(c); see PEB Commentary on the Uniform Commercial 
Code: Commentary No. 7, reprinted in [Fmdex/PEB Commentaries] U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) [hereinafter PEB Commentary 7J. 
137. To the credit of the drafters of Article 9, they apparently recognized the infir-
mities of rules that give rise to difficult fact questions. This point can be illustrated by 
their decision to reject a rule which would have required the secured party to re-
perfect its security interest in the removal state within a certain period of time after 
the secured party learned of the removal. See A Second Look at the Amendments to 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 Bus. Law. 973, 978-79 (1974). 
138. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
139. u.c.c. §§ 9-203(2), 9-306(2). 
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the buyer does not seem unduly harsh.140 If, however, the sale was 
unauthorized, there is a high degree of probability that the secured 
party will not receive timely notice of its occurrence. Because this 
failure is likely to cost the secured party its proceeds, continuation of 
the security interest in the original collateral is necessary.141 In short, 
"authorized" and "unauthorized" dispositions are shorthand expres-
sions of radically different degrees of likelihood that the secured 
party's interest in proceeds will have sufficient economic value to sub-
stitute for the loss of original collateral. 
Under the takings jurisprudence of Article 9, because the sale to B 
was unauthorized, the rule of section 9-403(2) is presumptively inap-
propriate even as to her.142 Of course, even if we were to conclude 
otherwise, it would not suggest that B should be treated differently 
from Land SP-2.143 This discussion regarding compensation provides 
only the most general answer to the question. Determining the wis-
dom of a conditional priority rule, even in cases where there is com-
pensation for the taking, depends upon how well the rule promotes a 
fair and efficient system of secured credit. 
C. Section 9-306(3): Proceeds 
Section 9-306(3) provides that a security interest in proceeds is a 
"continuously perfected security interest if the interest in the original 
collateral was perfected .... "144 This period of automatic perfection 
is limited to ten days after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor unless 
one of the requirements of subsection (3) has been met.145 The fol-
140. See supra note 120. 
141. Id. 
142. In the context of lapse problems arising under § 9-403(2), all sales will be un-
authorized. If the situation were otherwise, the buyer would take free of the security 
interest under § 9-306(2) and issues of perfection would be irrelevant. 
143. The stated intention of this Article is to explore when a taking of the secured 
party's interest in the original collateral is permissible. This analysis does not intply, 
however, that all permissible takings ought to occur. Any truly rational approach to 
priorities requires consideration of the balance of all relevant reasons, including rea-
sons pertaining to fairness and economic efficiency. 
144. u.c.c. § 9-306(3). 
145. The secured party's interest will continue to be perfected beyond the ten-day 
period if: 
Id. 
(a) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds 
are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the 
office or offices where the financing statement has been filed and, if the pro-
ceeds are acquired with cash proceeds, the description of collateral in the 
financing statement indicates the types of property constituting the pro-
ceeds; or 
(b) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds 
are identifiable cash proceeds; or 
(c) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the expiration of 
the ten-day period. 
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lowing pattern of interests illustrates one way in which a lapse prob-
lem could occur:146 
March 1 - Secured Party-1 (SP-1) perfects (by notation on the 
certificate of title)147 a security interest in a truck. 
April 1 - Debtor trades the first truck for a second truck. 
April 5 - L acquires a judicial lien on the second truck or 
Debtor sells the second truck to B or 
Secured Party-2 (SP-2) perfects (by notation on the 
certificate of title) a security interest in the second 
truck. 
April 12 - SP-1 has not had its interest noted on the certificate of 
title for the second truck. 
Within this pattern of interests, SP-1 would have had priority over 
L, B, and SP-2 through April 11.148 How these interests rank thereaf-
ter will depend on whether the ten-day period of automatic perfection 
is a grace period or a period of absolute protection.149 As for the 
statutory text and its accompanying comments, neither offers a solu-
tion to the problem. 
Thus, to understand and evaluate whether particular priority out-
comes reflect a coherent approach to lapse, attention must focus on 
the extent to which SP-1 is likely to be compensated for any taking 
that might occur. As previously argued at length, L and SP-2 should 
never step-up in priority because there is no compelling reason why 
they should,150 and their dealings with the debtor produce no identifi-
able proceeds to which SP-l's security interest could attach.151 
In deciding whether to perm.it buyers of first generation proceeds to 
advance in priority, the fundamental problem is determining the capa-
bility of the secured party to safeguard its interest in the second gener-
ation proceeds. No one should be taxed with demonstrating \vith 
absolute certainty what would occur in an actual potential proceeds 
146. The idea of creating a lapsed perfection problem by having the debtor trade in 
one truck for another comes from the not so hypothetical case of Security Sav. Bank 
v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Iowa 1977). There the United States acquired 
a tax lien during the ten-day period of automatic perfection. Relying on the approach 
taken by the drafters in § 9-403(2), the court held that the relative rights of the parties 
were reordered once the secured party's perfection lapsed Id. at 447. 
147. Inasmuch as the truck would be covered by a certificate of title statute, the 
filing requirements of Article 9 are not applicable. See U.C.C. § 9-302(3). 
148. See id. §§ 2-201 ("Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds"). 9-301(l}(a)-(c) 
("Persons Who Take Priority Over Unperfected Security Interests; Rights of Lien 
Creditor''), 9-306(3) ("Proceeds; Secured Party's Rights on Disposition of Collat-
eral"), 9-312(5) ("Priorities Among Conflicting Security Interests in the Same 
Collateral"). 
149. Because under § 9-306 a security interest in proceeds must be perfected 
through one of the methods permitted for original collateral, SP-1 had until ten days 
after receipt of the second truck by the debtor to perfect its interest through compli-
ance with the certificate of title statute. Id. § 9-306(3). 
150. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
151. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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situation.152 The central question must be what capabilities secured 
parties are likely to have, rather than speculation about what might, or 
could, occur. A showing that the secured party has the capability of 
obtaining the proceeds requires nothing more than demonstrating the 
customary absence of barriers and the lead time necessary to take 
whatever action is needed or desired. 
The key step in this analysis should be an inquiry into whether the 
debtor's disposition of the original collateral had been authorized by 
the secured party. This is another way of asking whether there is rea-
son to believe, on the basis of commercial experience, that the secured 
party had set up a monitoring system to keep tabs on its collateral. If 
so, the secured party would be expected to be in a position to move 
easily and promptly in response to the first sale and, presumably, the 
second. The only situation in which this conclusion might not hold 
true would be when the first sale was authorized, but the second sale 
was not. On the other hand, if the first sale was unauthorized it would 
usually mean that the secured party would not receive timely notice of 
the second sale. 
Recognizing that an inquiry into whether the disposition of the orig-
inal collateral and its proceeds was authorized by the secured party is 
useful in screening cases of likely compensation. It does not, however, 
compel the conclusion that such a test should be adopted to determine 
the post-lapse priority of a pre-lapse intervening buyer. The principal 
problem with the use of this idea as a test, however, is that deciding 
the question of authorization in particular cases may be complex. 
Moreover, there is no valid reason why lapse should affect pre-lapse 
priorities.153 By contrast, a bright-line rule protecting the secured 
party has the comparative virtue of simplicity. For these reasons, an 
ad hoc inquiry into authorization would be an exceptionally poor way 
to handle the question of how buyers should be treated in lapse situa-
tions under section 9-306(3). The relevant considerations can be cap-
tured more sensibly by a rule that preserves the secured party's 
priority in all cases. 
D. Summary 
This part of the Article has shown that the compensation principle 
contributes significantly to the choice of post-lapse priority rules. To 
the extent possible, the secured party should be compensated for any 
loss of priority. The best, and perhaps only, way to accomplish this is 
to determine whether the debtor's transaction with the intervening 
152. The infinite variety of possible situations would make this an impossible task. 
Moreover, the existing empirical evidence on the behavior of the secured credit sys-
tem is inadequate for drawing trustworthy conclusions about the way the system actu-
ally performs. Anecdotes simply do not provide the information one needs to answer 
a wide range of questions, from theory to policy. 
153. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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pre-lapse claimant has produced identifiable proceeds, and to pre-
serve the secured party's initial priority where it has not. The diffi-
culty comes in identifying those situations where the proceeds will 
actually work to maintain the overall value of the secured party's in-
terest. At a minimum, the significance of the proceeds claim will de-
pend on tlie secured party knowing that the disposition has occurred. 
Unless we wish to make the actual knowledge of the secured party an 
issue in every case, a system of rules is needed to decide when the 
secured party should be treated as having knowledge. 
In selecting post-lapse priority rules, there are three relevant claim-
ants to consider: (1) another secured party; (2) a lien creditor; and (3) 
an intervening buyer. The easy cases involve either another secured 
party or a lien creditor. These claimants should receive equal treat-
ment because neither is responsible for any proceeds which might en-
hance the first secured party's position. Accordingly, the relative 
priority of the parties pre-lapse should be viewed as absolute, rather 
than conditional. 
The problem is somewhat more difficult in the third instance when 
the intervening claimant is a buyer. The compensation principle rec-
ommends one of two responses. Frrst, there are cases where the se-
cured party cannot be expected to know that a sale of the collateral 
has occurred. In this situation the secured party's rational ignorance 
prevents it from exercising dominion and control over the proceeds 
should it choose to do so. When the relevant sale was unauthorized 
by the secured party, its ignorance can be presumed. In these cases 
the Code should adopt a rule of absolute priority. This clearly would 
be a rule designed to foster the compensation principle. Second, when 
the sale was authorized by the secured party, we may say that a pre-
sumption of knowledge is reasonable. With this in mind, we can char-
acterize a rule of conditional priority as consistent with the 
compensation principle.154 
IV. MORE EXAMPLES 
This Article began with the premise that one characteristic of all 
forms of private property is the specific remedial power to exclude 
others.155 After articulating the remedies available to a secured party, 
the article demonstrated that a security interest fits this concept of 
property.156 This reconceptualization of a security interest as property 
has potentially broad normative consequences. In general, rights of 
property ought to be respected. It follows that, while property is 
154. Once again, this Article, does not claim that, if compensated, a secured party 
should always lose its pre-lapse priority, post-lapse. It does assert, however, that with-
out compensation, a secured party's pre-lapse priority should always be preserved. 
155. See supra notes 14-40 and accompanying text 
156. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. 
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hardly inviolate today, the government should not be permitted to de-
stroy property without compensating the owner. 
Some provisions in Article 9 are intended to respond to a "taking" 
of the secured party's property and thus to promote principles of com-
pensation. One example is the idea that the secured party is entitled 
to the proceeds of a sale or disposition of collateral. Similarly, when 
collateral is commingled or processed, the secured party is automati-
cally compensated for its loss by receiving a substitute security interest 
in the product or mass. 157 
This basic idea has several benefits. Primarily it is a plausible way 
to determine the wisdom of particular priority rules and to resolve 
statutory ambiguities. From the vantage point of the compensation 
principle, we have seen that many of the rules governing post-lapse 
priorities are ill-advised. In many other cases, the compensation prin-
ciple will be a helpful guide. For example, there may be a question of 
whether particular property should be treated as proceeds. To 
demonstrate, courts have almost equally split on the issue of whether 
amounts received by the debtor from a tort-feasor who caused dam-
age to the collateral constitute proceeds.158 The courts that have been 
unwilling to include tort payments in the definition of proceeds have 
based their decisions on a literal reading of section 9-306(2) that effec-
tively excludes any disposition that does not involve a voluntary trans-
fer of collateral.159 A proper analysis should look instead to the 
implications of the disposition, rather than its form. 160 
Courts seeking to determine whether property should be deemed 
proceeds should be concerned principally with the extent to which the 
disposition diminishes the value of the secured party's interest. Pro-
ceeds should be recognized whenever an economic substitute for col-
lateral-that is, compensation-is needed, regardless of whether the 
new property arises out of a transaction that is technically voluntary. 
This broad conception of proceeds will minimize arbitrariness, build 
coherence in the law, and advance the policies embodied in section 9-
306(2). 
One common effort in recent years has been to find a consequence-
oriented approach for resolving post-default conflicts between com-
peting security interests.161 Although Article 9 explicitly envisions the 
existence of junior security interests in collateral,162 it is presently 
157. See supra note 106. 
158. Compare In re Boyd, 658 P.2d 470, 474 (Okla. 1983) (holdig that monies re-
ceived from tort feasor are not proceeds) with In re Stone, 52 B.R. 305, 307-08 
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (ruling that monies received from tort feasor are proceeds). 
159. See Boyd, 658 P.2d at 474. 
160. Although a tort claim should qualify as proceeds under§ 9-306(1), it could not 
be the subject of a valid security interest because tort claims are excluded from Arti-
cle 9 by § 9-104(k). 
161. See supra notes 114-53. 
162. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3). 
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silent on many of the issues raised in connection with the junior's 
enforcement. One topic that has generated extensive discussion con-
cerns the junior's right to retain proceeds arising from the disposition 
of collateral under section 9-504 or collections from account debtors 
and other obligors under section 9-502.163 The Article 9 Drafting 
Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws has proposed that the junior has no obligation to apply the 
proceeds of collection or other disposition to a debt secured by a se-
nior lien on the collateral.164 
On its face, the Committee's proposal inherently involves compen-
sation concerns, which means that following such a rule may result in 
a taking of the senior's interest. The purpose of this Article is not to' 
provide a general analysis of what the rules are, or ought to be, when 
there are multiple security interests in collateral. A few points may be 
made briefly. A junior's disposal of goods normally will have no ef-
fect on the validity of the senior's lien.165 Although there may be po-
tentially adverse consequences for the senior, 166 permitting the junior 
to retain the proceeds would not necessarily undermine the compen-
sation principle. In the collections context, it is significant that the 
value of the collateral is destroyed by the very act that created the 
proceeds. Accordingly, if the senior can be denied the proceeds, op-
portunities could arise for the junior to destroy its lien without com-
pensation. Recognizing this fact might help to explain the suggestion 
by the Reporters for the Article 9 Drafting Committee that it revisit 
the issue once more.167 
163. See generally Permanent Editorial Board For The Uniform Commercial Code, 
PEB Study Group Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Repon § 30, at 216-22 (1992) 
[hereinafter PEB Article 9 Repon] (advocating a broad reading of the shelter princi-
ple as to junior interests). 
164. See U.C.C. §§ 9-502, 9-504 (Tentative Draft Aug. 4, 1995). 
165. See id. § 9-504(4) ("When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after 
default, the disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights 
therein, discharges the security interest under which it [was] made and any security 
interest or lien subordinate thereto." (emphasis added)}. 
166. At a minimum, the senior will have to locate the collateral and must deal with 
a stranger to the original transaction. See PEB Article 9 Report, supra note 163, at 
220-22. For these reasons, among others, the Article 9 Study Committee thought it 
appropriate to provide in the statutory text or comments that the senior has the right 
to take the collateral away from the junior. Id. at 221-22. 
167. See U.C.C. § 9-502 Reporters' Explanatory Note 8 (Tentative Draft Aug. 5, 
1995). Those defending a rule that would protect the junior's right to retain the pro-
ceeds might claim that it is justified by the general principles of negotiability underly-
ing official comment 2(c) to§ 9-306 and PEB Commentary No. 7. See supra note 136. 
Whether they are correct to conclude that the Code's interest in protecting transfer-
ees of proceeds in the "ordinary course" of the borrower's business is in fact suffi-
ciently compelling in this setting is a distinct question. If we have a sincere 
commitment to the U.C.C. filing system, and the concept of priority, it would seem 
that the junior should not be permitted to keep the proceeds \vith impunity. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although more attention to these compensation issues is surely 
warranted, fuller treatment requires a degree of detail inappropriate 
to the scope of this Article. The intent of this Article is to outline the 
general contours of a model of priorities that is based on the implicit 
takings jurisprudence of Article 9. The model would not replace ex-
isting models with another; rather, it would recognize the diversity of 
potentially conflicting claims, and would accord a level of protection 
commensurate with the interest at stake. If compensation for the tak-
ing of a security interest is a demand of fairness, even limited devia-
tions from it should be justified only by strong, countervailing reasons. 
